has to do with a reasonable complaint which is met in a reasonable manner in other countries we are at a loss to comprehend. It goes far to explain, however, how it happens that the Radical leaders are being steadily driven from English industrial constituencies and are forced to take refuge in Scotland or on the Welsh border. We have certainly no complaint to make of that, and we hope that the present Government have the sagacity and the courage to profit by the object lesson, and to press forward, as a first instalment, measures so reasonable and just as the three to which we have referred.

THE REVOLT IN CUBA.

AN exceedingly complex problem is presented to the world by the aspect of affairs in the island of Cuba. Military, financial, and international considerations complicate the struggle and obscure the issue. Under these circumstances it would be extremely unwise to approach the question in other than an impartial spirit. Nor is there, indeed, much to induce the disinterested spectator to become an active partisan. There is little on either side that attracts, and much on both that repels; while, from whatever point of view the rebellion be regarded, it does not afford, either to the supporter of Spain or of the rebels, much opportunity for enthusiasm, sentiment, or gush. It is impossible to get away from the fact that the Spaniards are fighting in defence of a system of government and taxation which can only be described as intolerable; that the sympathy of the entire Cuban-born population is bitterly opposed to them; and that in spite of the bravery of the troops and the courtesy of their officers, those elements exist in the Spanish army of to-day—elements hitherto subdued by the firm humanity of Martinez de Campos—which have made the Inquisition and the atrocities of the conquest of Mexico historical facts. The rebels, on the other hand, consist of the most boastful and braggart section of a mongrel race. They "outmanœuvre and hold in check" the Government forces in much the same way that a comparatively small number of rogues and rowdies in London manage to provide an occupation for thirteen thousand Metropolitan policemen. While posing as heroes, and proclaiming that with inferior numbers they maintain themselves against the Spanish troops, they never venture to attack unless in a superiority of at least five to one. Even then they are almost always beaten, and escape capture and destruction at the end of the day by the fullest development of what is airily termed by their supporters "their superior mobility"! Their policy of destroying property, and particularly of firing the cane and tobacco fields, is, however, most effective. The combustibility of these crops at this time of year renders such a task an easy one. A pellet of phosphorus dropped overnight is ignited by the morning sun, and starts a conflagration involving the loss of thousands of pounds. The Spanish authorities are powerless to cope with this form of outrage, which no preponderance of military strength can prevent. The effects are threefold. Firstly, the destruction of the sugar industry throws thousands of labourers out of employment. Thus the insurgent cause is recruited. Secondly, burning the sugar-cane ensures the bankruptcy of the island, and hence prevents it being used as security for loans to carry on the war. Thirdly, as may be imagined, the inability of the Government to afford protection to the staple industry of the country detaches from the Spanish cause many who would otherwise remain faithful. Such tactics are more effective than commendable. The spectacle of a colony adopting such a policy is hardly one which should obtain recognition from any highly civilized nation, still less from a great colonial Power. Hard-fought actions in the field, gallantry in the face of odds, have often turned rebels into belligerents, and belligerents into the founders of independent States. But history does not record an instance of mere indiscriminate destruction of property receiving the official approval of a first-class Power.

I repeat that whatever feelings the Cuban revolt may or may not arouse, it affords little room for sentiment. Let us approach the question, therefore, guided alone by the steady light of common sense, and check the results of a scrutiny by a cool calculation of the profit and the loss. The rebel victory offers little good either to the world in general or to Cuba in particular. With Cuba as a Spanish colony, Spain is responsible for its behaviour toward foreign States and its respect of international law; but with "Cuba Libra," instead of dealing with a traditionally friendly Power, we should have to prepare ourselves for another irresponsible firebrand republic of the South American type. That is not an inviting prospect for the outside world; nor does independence offer much to the islanders themselves. All impartial residents in the island are agreed that, though the Spanish Administration is bad, a Cuban Government would be worse—equally corrupt, more capricious, and far less stable. Under such a Government revolutions would be periodic, property insecure, equity unknown. A graver danger presents itself. Two-fifths of the insurgents in the field, and by far the bravest and best disciplined part of the rebel forces, are pure negroes. These men, with Antonio Maceo at their head, would, in the event of success, demand a predominant share in the government of the country. Such a claim would be indignantly resisted by the white section, and a racial war, probably conducted with bitter animosity and ferocious cruelty, would ensue, the result being, after years of fighting, another black republic, or at best a partition of the island, as in San Domingo. This is the situation to produce which the richest island in the world is to be ruined; and it is to bring about such a state of things that it is suggested that England should quarrel with her oldest and most faithful ally. Fortunately we are too sensible a nation to adopt such a course.

Finally, let us consider the chances of Spain. Mr. Hubert Howard, in his article of last week, says "The cause of Spain is in extremities," and again, "Spain is making her last cast." These assertions are at least premature. It is not easy to assign limits to the capacities and resources of a European Power with a population of twenty millions—especially when it is evident that it is earnestly determined.

If General Weyler be well advised, he will avoid the mistakes of Martinez de Campos as a soldier and scrupulously adhere to his magnanimous and humane policy as a statesman. He will concentrate the fifty or sixty thousand men frittered away in the protection of plantations and villages throughout the island. He will combine the movements of the columns into one concerted scheme. He will employ to the fullest extent the cavalry reinforcements now placed at his disposal, and he will infuse a greater spirit of energetic perseverance into the tactics of his subordinates. If he does these things, and if, at the same time, he avoids the senseless cruelties of the former war, which would now precipitate the intervention of the United States, Spain may yet retain her colony. It will then become the duty of the European Powers, and also the duty of that State whose "fiat is law," to insist upon the proper redress of Cuban grievances, and upon the establishment of a form of government in the island more progressive and less corrupt. Under these conditions the world may yet see the great industries and the vast resources of "La perla de las Antillas" adequately developed. We may yet see good government where now is anarchy, prosperity in the place of ruin, peace instead of war.

WINSTON L. CHURCHILL.

SEA-FISHING IN WINTER.

THE winter fishermen of our grandfathers' time were hardy perennials who, commencing with well-greased kneeboots, following on with many stout garments, a chimneypot hat surmounting all, would troll for pike in the hardest weather, sometimes breaking holes in the ice before they could get their baits into the water. When the railway train of modern times brought the rivers of Scotland almost to the doors of dwellers in southern England, an addition came to the tribe in the shape of still hardier individuals who harl or flog the larger rivers of Scotland for early spring salmon in the months of January and February.

Of late we have had a great increase in the body of winter anglers by the general awakening to the fact that, tide and weather permitting, really excellent fishing,

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in battleships; and, if we can be beaten in a pitched battle, of what use is it to take precautions to prevent our enemies bleeding us slowly to death? But on the most important head of officers and men the provision made is wholly unsatisfactory and insufficient. To officer our ships built and building in 1895 we required about 2,000 lieutenants, and we have now about 1,200, so that, leaving quite out of consideration the ships to be added, we are 800 short. Nine years is the period required to train a lieutenant; and it is plain, therefore, that unless very large additions are made instantly to the number of cadets, we shall not for ten years be able to officer our fleet. The Naval Reserve officers, though excellent in every way, cannot for one moment be considered equal to the English, French, or Russian fully trained lieutenants. In a word, they are amateurs, not experts, and either they must be introduced and scattered on board all our ships, thus lowering the general average of quality, or a large portion of our fleet must stay at home in harbour. We have no officers to fill up the inevitable casualties which action would inflict. We have no true reserve of officers. And is not this a very grave weakness, not to be concealed by any optimistic commonplaces?

As with officers, so with men. Lord Brassey calculates that 97,700 men are required to man all our ships, excluding those of the new programme. And another estimate drawn up privately by competent experts places the figure much higher. The total voted this year is 93,750, but new ships which will absorb no fewer than 10,000 men have been added; so that in 1899 we shall require 103,000 men or more. A seaman is not trained in less than four years, and therefore, when adding to our force of ships, an equivalent addition should always be made to our force of men. Through the omission of this common-sense precaution we now find ourselves with a large number of ships which we could not send to sea with trained crews, and our case threatens to grow worse. We have absolutely no trained reserve. The Royal Naval Reserve is an admirable force, but it does not and cannot turn out tried and trained men. It does not give half as good material as the "Inscription Maritime." Its members cannot be found at a moment's notice. They could not be used anywhere else in action than below the armour-deck, because they lack the high skill which modern specialization requires of its votaries. I doubt if most people realize the immense divergence which has arisen between the war-sailor and the merchant-sailor. Even below the protective deck the conditions in action will be so trying to the nerves that little can be expected from any man who is not trained to the full, and imbued with those splendid traditions and that high devotion which can only be acquired by years of service in the Navy. Nor could we afford to withdraw from our merchant shipping its very small leavening of English able seamen. No less than 47 per cent. of the crews of our sailing-ships and 35 per cent. of our steamships' complements are German, Dutch, or Scandinavian. These men in war would be a terrible source of peril to our carrying trade. The only way out of our difficulty is to man the fleet half with long-service seamen as at present, half with short-service marines, and to provide that the marine, after his four or five years in the Navy, shall for twelve or fifteen remain in reserve, and be occasionally called out for a few weeks. As matters are, how can England with a bare 118,000 men, including every naval reservist, be said to be superior to France and Russia, with their total of 200,000 trained men? Not ships but men win battles—men tried and annealed by years of discipline and danger.

H. W. Wilson.

AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN CUBA.

THREE weeks ago in an article in this Review I stated that the Cuban question was one of considerable difficulty. During the last few days its complications have become still "worse confounded" and have assumed a much more serious aspect. The recent action by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States has raised the whole subject to one of the first importance, and Venezuela, the Transvaal, and Armenia have each and all been hustled into comparative obscurity to make room for the latest international sensation.

A double pressure has operated to induce Congress to adopt its present attitude. Firstly, the agitation of Americans at home, and, secondly, the influence exerted by those resident in Cuba. The people of the United States have long viewed the efforts which the Cubans are making to obtain independence with sympathy and approbation. Situated only three hundred miles from the coast of Florida, the island is much frequented as a winter and pleasure resort by all classes of Americans, and its troubles and disasters not unnaturally attract attention and excite interest throughout the States. The rebels have a powerful backing in New York and Washington. They make no secret of their desire to be included in the Union. Most of the wealthy Cubans are naturalized American citizens, and many daring spirits from the Southern and Eastern States are taking an active part in the rebellion. To these considerations add those of trade and commerce, and the interest with which the present struggle is regarded in America will be easily understood. Stimulated by organized agitation, that interest results directly in the resolutions passed by the Legislature of the United States, during the past week, in favour of according belligerent rights to the insurgents and of the ultimate independence of the island. Look, also, at the influence exerted by citizens resident in Cuba itself. Now that war and disease have driven away the tourists, there remain, broadly speaking, three classes of Americans in the island. First of all there is the planter, usually a native of Cuba who, out of dislike for the Spanish Government, has naturalized himself a citizen of the United States. This class is naturally eager for peace. They are overtaxed even at the best of times, and during the revolt are compelled to pay to both sides, as the insurgents extort money by threatening to burn their plantations. Secondly, there is the very complete consular service maintained in Cuba by the United States. These men—consuls and vice-consuls—are in entire sympathy with the rebels, and in many cases are actively intriguing on their behalf. Should the American administration follow their recommendations, there is little doubt as to what its action will be. Finally, there are the "filibusters"; active, daring men, who, drawn by love of adventure and hatred of the Spaniards into the insurgent ranks, are the real backbone of the rebellion. It will thus be seen that each class, though in a different way, exerts an influence in favour of some form of American intervention. And this brings us again to the resolutions of last week.

I have thus briefly discussed the causes which have led to the recent vote of Congress, by which the recognition of the insurgents was advocated. The motives are excellent and unassailable, but the action which those motives have produced is to be deprecated. The rebels have no claim to be called belligerents. They neither fight bravely nor do they use their weapons effectively. They cannot win a single battle or hold a single town. Their army, consisting to a large extent of coloured men, is an undisciplined rabble. Their President skulks in America. Their generals and bravest soldiers are aliens. Their supplies are obtained by plunder and blackmail, and their only formidable weapon is the torch of the incendiary. Besides all these facts, their success does not offer any prospect of better times or wiser government. Neither on the ground of their power nor of their courage do the insurgents deserve recognition or independence. It seems strange indeed that the very nation which denied autonomy to the Confederacy should advocate it in the case of the Cuban rebels.

Another argument which carried great weight with Congress was the alleged cruelty and barbarity of the Spaniards. Personally, I do not believe that there has been any unwarrantable exercise of severity during the present war. The Spanish Government have offered ample and sweeping reforms, and well-directed intervention might easily obtain adequate guarantees that they would be carried out. But Spain refuses, and rightly refuses, to treat with rebels in arms—a principle which is maintained by other civilized States. Nor, in the actual conduct of the war, has any departure from

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modern practices been permitted? Every rebel who cares to surrender himself becomes what is termed a "presentado" and is allowed to go to his home unquestioned and unharmed. Chiefs and leaders captured in the field are tried by court-martial and frequently shot, and the rank and file taken in arms are condemned to terms of penal servitude at Ceuta. But the numbers in both cases are but small, as Cuban patriots take no unnecessary chances. Certainly fewer have been shot as rebels by the Government than as so-called "traitors" by the insurgents.

When the sacrifices Spain is making to maintain an exasperating struggle are considered, it will be apparent that her moderation is extremely creditable. And if that may be said of the Government at home, with how much more force does it apply to the conduct of soldiers in the field who, though irritated by methods of warfare peculiarly trying and painful to European troops, have loyally carried out a temperate policy. Certainly when one recalls the methods of South American Republics in dealing with their frequent revolutions, and speculates on the terms which the administration of "Free Cuba" would offer to rebels, one cannot feel much indignation.

Finally, it is well to consider the aims and probable results of American intervention. If the United States is prepared to include Cuba in the Union, she could probably seize the island, though the undertaking would be a much bigger business than is sometimes imagined. Such a course would be manifestly unfair to Spain, and justifiable only by right of conquest; but it would be for the good of Cuba and of the world, and European nations would have no motive for interference. But if, as is probable, we are to be threatened with the establishment of another Republic, under the ægis of the Monroe Doctrine, or if Cuba is to be presented to Mexico—which comes to the same thing—then European protest will at least be justifiable.

In conclusion, it is by no means clear that active intervention by the United States would benefit the insurgents or immediately terminate the insurrection. The Spanish force in Cuba is very great, and it is impossible for 120,000 European soldiers to march and fight for upwards of a year without acquiring endurance, composure under fire, and knowledge of the country to a considerable degree. When those troops begin by being as good material as are the Spanish infantry of to-day, they only require to be confronted with a tangible enemy to be formidable antagonists.

Three months at least would elapse before the American Government could place a sufficient number of regulars in Cuba to cope effectively with the Spanish army. By that time, restraint being removed by the declaration of war, there might, indeed, be some foundation for the charge of barbarity.

The matter is grave. It is a serious business for Cuba, for the United States, but most of all for Spain. Spaniards of all classes will find it to their advantage to adopt a calm and conciliatory demeanour, and so avert extremities. But should the Spanish people, hard pressed as they are already, be forced by the United States to further efforts to preserve their most treasured possession, they will not be without sympathizers among the nations of Europe, and perhaps may even find a friend. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

SHARPS.*

TO explain the title of this article it may be observed that "sharps," like "middlings," is the term employed by corn-millers for the mixture of coarse flour and bran that remains after the finest flour has been carefully extracted. The term, thus employed, has a peculiar suitability to the book before us, which, apart from the happy accident of the names of its makers, has as its distinguishing characteristic a preference of quantity to quality, which swells the volume by the admission of a huge quantity of bran, that is to say, of inferior and of un-Celtic verse. The size, had average skill in selection been exercised, would have been about one-half of that of the formidable volume in question.

Seriously, this mistake runs through and spoils a book that might have been of great value and interest. One would think that the Editor's object in selection was to exclude nothing that could be included even on the flimsiest excuse. That Mr. William Sharp is equally to be condemned for this strange notion of editing is abundantly plain from the whole tenour of his introduction. It may be as well to examine this introduction before we examine the rest of the book; for the faults we shall have to note are nowhere else to be found in a more aggravated form.

The keynote of the book, its pretentiousness, is given in the first line, where Mr. William Sharp, anxious to display his Saxon as well as his Celtic erudition, uses the pedantic "foreword" for the customary "introduction." He is, however, decidedly original in the argument he employs to recommend the present collection. His argument, indeed, is alarming as well as original. To reconcile his readers to the "Sharps," the mixture of much bran and a little flour, with which they are presented in "Lyra Celtica," he threatens them with a "much larger, more organic, and more adequately representative work to be called 'Anthologia Celtica.'" In other words, he commends to them his "Sharps" should they be inclined to grumble at the liberal allowance of bran by the information that the present work is practically a selection from a much larger work in which, presumably, there will be even less flour adulterated by a far more enormous proportion of bran.

Certainly he brings one subtle and skilful influence to bear to reconcile the more dainty reader to the bran-diet, mixed with occasional and excellent titbits, which the Editor has prepared for them. He offers them first the dry sawdust of his preface, and any one, who has managed to make his way through that, will certainly find the bran of the most inferior of the selections both palatable and nutritious. For one thing every reader may be devoutly thankful. Mr. Sharp assures us that "the text and notes have absorbed much of the space allotted for a preliminary dissertation on the distinguishing qualities and characteristics of Celtic literature." This is certainly fortunate for the book as well as for its readers. Few, and those only the most omnivorous, readers could have retained an appetite for the flour, much less for the bran, had the preliminary diet of sawdust been considerably extended. Even as it is, we would strongly advise the more fastidious reader to skip the preface, and at once get to work at the more readable body of the anthology.

It must, however, be admitted that any one who has the patience to grope among the sawdust will be likely to find some gems of criticism, criticism which is rather likely to give amusement by its form than instruction by its justice and discernment. Mr. Sharp speaks patronizingly of Matthew Arnold's essay on Celtic Literature "so superficial in its knowledge," to which probably the very existence of his present attempt to exploit the Celtic Revival is due. His own superior knowledge is vouched for by an immense array of names and works of Celtic specialists, but it would be well if he had learned from Matthew Arnold the value of measure and balance in literary criticism, and applied these elementary principles in the business he had taken in hand. For what are his principles of selection, and how are they applied? He does not, of course, confine himself to specimens selected from ancient Irish and Scottish, from ancient Cornish, early Armorican (Breton), early Cymric, and mediæval Welsh. These occupy a thinly printed 82 pages out of 372 pages—not very much more than one-fifth of the whole selections. It is with modern and contemporary Celtic work that he fills the remaining four-fifths. Mr. Sharp begins by informing us that he will not insist on claiming Shakspeare as a Celt, though, as we know little of Shakspeare's ancestry, he might do so. "Milton was of Welsh blood through his maternal descent, and Keats is a Celtic name." Again, "Keats, born a Cockney, is pre-eminently a Celtic poet by virtue of the nationality of the brain, if for no other authentic reason; while Moore, born in Ireland, of Celtic ancestry, is the least Celtic of all modern poets of eminence." Of Coleridge and Shelley he observes, "Who can say there is nothing atavistic in their genius?" He does not, it is true, claim all

* "Lyra Celtica: an Anthology of Representative Celtic Poetry." Edited by Elizabeth A. Sharp. With Introduction and Notes by William Sharp. Edinburgh: Patrick Geddes and Colleagues. 1896.

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